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Abstract 
Boudol, G. and K.G. Larsen, Graphical versus logical specifications, Theoretical Computer Science 
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This paper studies the relations between two specification formalisms and verification methods for 
concurrent systems, namely Larsen-Thomsen’s modal transition systems - here called graphical 
specifications - and Hennessy-Milner Logic. We show that any graphical specification may be 
expressed by a logical specification having the same models. Conversely, we give a characterization 
of the formulae that are graphically representable. 
1. Introduction 
The purpose of this paper is to investigate the relationships between two ap- 
proaches to the verification of concurrent systems: the logical approach, and what we 
call the graphical approach. 
Following the logical approach, a specification is a set of properties, that is a set of 
formulae of some logic, and verification is a model-checking activity. We denote “the 
process P is a model of the formula 4” by 
The model we shall use for concurrent processes is that of labeiled transition systems. 
This is a common model for many existing verification tools, cf. for instance [i-S, 131. 
The properties that one states about these systems are expressed in Hennessy-Milner 
Logic [7]. 
In the “graphical” approach, processes and specifications are systems of the same 
kind - namely labelled transition systems - and the verification amounts to compare 
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such systems. We call this approach graphical because a transition system is just 
a special case of graph. Indeed a process or a specification is best understood by 
means of drawings, which moreover can be directly represented on a screeen and 
interpreted by a computer, using a graphical editor (cf. [2,3]). 
In many cases, the comparison of a process to a graphical specification is based on 
the notion of bisimulation: the process satisfies the specification if they are equivalent, 
up to some bisimulation depending on a particular observation criterion (cf. [13]). 
The resulting verification method is related to the logical one since two systems 
are bisimilar if and only if they satisfy the same formulae. This is the standard 
HennessyyMilner Theorem [7] : 
In comparing these two approaches to specification and verification (for a survey, see 
[ 15]), we may use several criteria: 
Expressivity: The specification formalism should be powerful enough to express all 
the properties of a given process. In other words, it should be possible to completely 
specify any labelled transition system, up to bisimulation. 
Modularity: Processes are often made out of several components, and it may be the 
case that some properties satisfied by the components are enough to ensure 
a property of the global system. Then we would expect a “reusability of proofs”: if 
one replaces a component by another satisfying the same sub-specification, then the 
whole specification should remain valid. 
Rejinement: One should have the ability to deal with partial specifications, requir- 
ing more and more properties about a system, up to its complete specification. 
Applying these criteria to the logical and the graphical (i.e. bisimulation) 









As one can see, the logical and graphical frameworks offer complementary advant- 
ages: on the graphical side, expressivity is trivial since a process is a specification of 
itself. Modularity is usually granted by the fact that bisimulations are compatible with 
(most) process constructors; for instance, the well-known weak bisimulation is a con- 
gruence with respect to the static operators of CCS (parallel composition, restriction, 
renaming). 
On the logical side, expressivity is achieved if we allow possibly infinite sets of 
formulae as logical specifications ~ this is the content of the Hennessy-Milner 
Graphical versus logical specifications 5 
Theorem. In some cases one can even characterize a system by a single formula (cf. 
[6,15]). The point of modularity is more dubious: for instance, in [6], a logic is 
presented which incorporates some process constructors. However, according to [ 161 
these operators are not logical (truth functional), and verification in such an extended 
logic involves graphical manipulations (quotient w.r.t. bisimulation). 
Regarding refinement, the two approaches are strikingly different: in the logical 
setting there is a natural refinement preorder on specifications (= sets of formulae), 
namely the inclusion of their classes of models. Restricted to formulae this preorder is 
From a practical point of view, one refines a logical specification simply by adding 
new requirements - note that this may lead to inconsistencies. On the other hand, 
there is no gradualness in graphical verification. How could we remedy this deficiency, 
and find an image of the logical refinement preorder in a graphical setting? 
Although this question was not his direct motivation, Milner showed in [14] (cf. 
also [16]) that the logical preorder corresponds to an observational preorder for 
a generalized notion of process, namely labelled transition systems equipped with 
a divergence predicate. The semantics of the logic has to be adapted to obtain this 
result. 
A different model, explicitly intended to provide a notion of graphical specification 
supporting refinement, was recently introduced in [12]. In this model, a yraphical 
specification (called there “modal transition system”) is a labelled transition system 
together with a predicate on transitions. This predicate asserts that some transitions 
must exist in any model of the specification; on the other hand, a model is allowed to 
perform only the transitions mentioned in the specification. Then one can define 
a refinement preorder between graphical systems, 
which can be read “the specification P is finer than S”, or also “P is a model of the 
specification S”. Here we shall not give examples motivating and illustrating the use of 
graphical specifications and refinement; these may be found in [9,10,12]. The notion 
of graphical specification contains the usual notion of process: a process is a graphical 
specification where the “certainty” predicate is total; moreover, the refinement preor- 
der generalizes strong bisimulation. Therefore, this model for specifications is expres- 
sive with respect to the class of labelled transition systems. Moreover, graphical 
specifications may be composed, and it has been shown in [9,12] that the refinement 
preorder is compatible with the usual process constructors; therefore, this framework 
supports modular verifications. 
The graphical approach seems to provide a well-behaved specification formalism; 
to confirm its adequacy, we want now to study its relations with the logical formalism. 
It is clear that we cannot capture “graphically” the whole logic, since any graphical 
specification is consistent. So, what is lost? Not so much, as we shall see: logic is the 
join-semilattice (with bottom) generated by the finite, acyclic graphical specifications. 
6 G. Boudol, KG. Larsen 
Let us now present more precisely our results. First we will show that 
Hennessy-Milner Logic has a natual interpretation with respect to graphical speci- 
fications, and that their theorem extends easily to this setting: a graphical specification 
is a refinement of another one if and only if it satisfies more formulae, i.e. 
We will give a syntax for the finite, acyclic’ graphical specifications - the correspond- 
ing set of terms is denoted by 0. We will then show that each term TV@ may be 
represented by a characteristic formula X(t), in the sense that 
t c t’ - x(t’)<x(t), 
0 t’+ x(t). 
In other words, to verify that a system satisfies the specification t amounts to check 
that this system is a model of the formula x(t) (or to check the validity of x( t’)< x( t), 
but this is in general quite complex). 
Our main interest was in exploring the converse relation: to what extent can logical 
model-checking be achieved by means of graphical manipulations? We would like to 
know which kind of formula $J can be graphically represented by a specification Q( 4) 
such that 
We show that this holds exactly when C#J is a (consistent) prime formula, that is 
irreducible with respect to disjunction - and in this case e(4) may be described by 
a term of 0. We can then summarize the content of the paper by saying that there is 
a Galois connection between the preordered set (n, <) of consistent prime formulae 
and the preordered set (0, F ) of finite acyclic graphical specifications. Moreover, any 
formula is logically equivalent to a finite disjunction of prime formulae, therefore, the 
logic can be regarded as generated by graphical specifications of 0. More precisely, 
our results establish a duality between logical theories (i.e. filters) and the upper power 
domain on (0, L). 
2. Graphical specifications and refinement 
2.1. Specifications 
A graphical specification, also called modal transition system in [12], is a labelled 
transition system equipped with a predicate on transitions. As a specification, such 
a system is intended to describe a whole class of possible realizations, rather than 
a particular process. Then the transition relation conveys the following meaning: it 
allows a model to perform the specified transitions, but the existence of these 
1 This is slightly inaccurate: we allow as a constant the loosest specification, which is cyclic. 
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transitions is not necessarily required. On the other hand, if the specification does not 
mention a particular transition, then this transition is disallowed from any possible 
model. The remaining ingredient of graphical specifications, the predicate on 
transitions, asserts that some transitions are required: these transitions must exist in 
any model of the specification. 
The formal definition is as follows: we assume that a finite set A of actions is given 
(finiteness is not a serious restriction, see the remarks below); then a graphical 
specification system S is a system (Q, 9,!), where 
(i) Q is the set of states; 
(ii) 9 L Q x A x Q is the transition relation, which is image-jnite, i.e. for all ~EQ and 
UEA the set {q’ ) (q, a, q’)E9} is finite; 
(iii) ! is a predicate on transitions, i.e. ! c 9. 
A graphical specijicution is a pair (S, s) where S = (Q, 9, !) is a specification system and 
SEQ an initial state. 
Notutiolis and Terminology. We shall use S, T, P,... to range over specification 
systems, p, q, s, . . . to range over states, and a, b,c,. . . to denote actions. For any 
specification system S = (Q, 9, !), we shall denote p { q (or simply p -% q) the fact that 
(p,u,q)~Q. These are the possible transitions allowed by S, whereas the transitions 
satisfying ! are the definite transitions required by the specification. We shall use the 
notation p + q (or simply p : q) for such definite transitions. The system S is a process 
system if every transition is required, i.e. ! = 9; in this case we simply denote S by (Q, 9). 
A process is a specification (S, s), where S is a process system. 
The original definition ([12]) was given in terms of two kinds of transitions: the may 
transitions p GO q, corresponding to our pLq, and the must transitions p 4 q q, 
related to the previous ones by a consistency assumption: 
a 
p+oq * P&4. 
This axiom asserts that if a state is required to perform the action a, then it is also 
allowed to do so. The “must” transitions correspond to our ! predicate. A process 
model that bears some similarities with our graphical specifications was proposed by 
Hennessy and Plotkin in [S]. They used predicates (p, q)Eafter, and pEcan,, which 
can be, respectively, interpreted as p2 q and 3qp : q. However, their “conjunctive 
nondeterministic processes” are deterministic and “total” transition systems, in the 
sense that for any state p and for any action a there exists exactly one state q such that 
p2 q. Therefore, in this model it is impossible to express the fact that an action is not 
allowed. 
Graphical specifications are best visualized by means of drawings, but for many 
purposes it is convenient to have a syntax. To relate the graphical and logical 
frameworks, we shall only need a very elementary syntax - richer ones, including 
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fixpoints or parallel composition, may be found in [lo, 121. The terms we shall deal 
with are given by the following grammar: 
t ::= 0 1 w 1 a.t 1 a!t ( (t+t), 
where a stands for any action. We use two prefixing constructs a - t and a ! t, corres- 
ponding, respectively, to the “may” and “must” transitions. The sum to + tl is like the 
CCS one, and 0 is an “empty” specification - disallowing any action - similar to CCS 
“nil”. We shall denote the set of terms by 0, and use t, U, u,... to range over terms. 
We now interpret these terms as graphical specifications. More specifically, each 
term t is a state of a graphical system 9, whose transitions are given by the following 
rules: 
This is the “loosest” specification (denoted @ in [ll]): w does not require anything, 
while allowing any possible move. The axioms for guarded terms are 
a.t&, a!t : t. 
We recall that a transition a! t 5 t is both allowed (i.e. a! t -f+ t) and required. There- 
fore, the term a. t allows initially an a action, while a! t requires this action, and both 
initially disallow any other transition. The rules for sum are 
tiA t ti 5 t 
3 (i=O, 1). 
t()+t$t to+t1 : t 
We shall freely use the notation &El L t. for a finite summation (which is 0 if I = 0). For 
instance, the term xbGB b . co, where B is a set of actions, represents a specification 
allowing only actions in B to occur initially. This term will be denoted us. 
Remark. To deal with an infinite alphabet of actions, we should introduce a constant 
erg = CbsB b . w for any cofinite set B of actions (that is BE A and A-B is finite). 
2.2. Refinement 
In this section we formalize what it means for a system to satisfy, or be a realization, 
of a specification. Intuitively, a specification is satisfied by a system if: 
(i) whenever the specification requires a transition, then a corresponding transition 
exists for sure in the system, and 
(ii) if a transition is possible in the system, then it is allowed by the specification. 
In fact, we shall define a relation (S, s) E (P, p) between specifications, which should be 
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read “the specification (S, s) is satisfied by (P, p)“, or “(P, p) is a refinement of (S, s)“. If 
(P,p) is a process, then we could say that (P,p) is a model, or an implementation of 
(S, s). We first define a notion of refinement between states of a given graphical system. 
Given a specification system S = (Q, 9, !), a rejinement over S is a relation R c Q x Q 
satisfying: 
if pRq then 
(i) p 5~ * 3q’q :q’&p!Rq’; 
(ii) q-%q’ 5 3p’pAp’&p’Rq’. 
As usual, we are interested in the largest such relation, i.e. 
P c 4 -def 3 R refinement p R q, 
and the following holds (cf. [9,12]): 
Lemma. The relation c is a rejinement and a preorder. 
This relation is extended to specifications (S,s) as follows: given two specification 
systems S = (Q, 9, !) and P = (Q’, 9, ! ‘), we denote by S 6 P their disjoint union - with 
an obvious definition, the set of states being ((0) x Q) u( { 1) x Q’) - and we shall say 
that (S, s) & (P, p) if and only if (0, s) & (1, p) in the system S ti P. We still say that 
(P, p) rejines or satisjes the specification (S, s) when (S, s) F (P, p) holds. For instance, 
(3, w) E (S, s) for any specification (S, s). The equivalence associated with the refine- 
ment preorder is denoted 21, thus 
Remark. Let us denote by N the (largest) bisimulation over process systems. Since 
a refinement over a process system is just a bisimulation, we have, if S is a process 
system then p G q o p-q. Moreover, if S = (Q, 9, !), and P is a process system (Q, K) 
such that ! c K c 9 then (S, q) c (P, q) for any qE Q. Therefore, any graphical specifica- 
tion is satisfied by some process. 
Since we assumed image-finiteness, the refinement preorder F is, as usual, the limit 
of a sequence of approximations. 
Lemma 2.1. Let S be a given speci$cation. For each nonnegative integer n, let ~~ be 
the relation on states of S inductively given by 
(i) pc,qforallpandq, 
p+p1 * 3q’.q+q’&p’&.q’, 
(4 P cn+ 1 4 * 
q$q. * 3p’.p++p’&p’ E,q’. 
Then p&qoVn.pE.q. 
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Proof. The proof is standard (cf. [7,9]). 0 
For what regards our syntax, the refinement preorder is well-behaved. 
Lemma 2.2. The refinement preorder over the system 99 is a precongruence, i.e. 
tLt’ =F= 
a.tFa.t’ and a!t&a!t’ 
t+sF t’+s and s+tEs+t’. 
Proof. The proof is straightforward. For instance, t+Cier ai. ti E t is true since 
EieI ai. ti does not require any transition. An obvious consequence of this property is 
t + 0 ‘v t. We could also easily prove that the sum is commutative and associative with 
respect to N, a fact that justifies our notation for finite summations. 0 
3. Logical characterization 
In this section we introduce the logical specification framework, and we show the 
correspondence between refinement of graphical specifications and “refinement” - i.e. 
inclusion - of logical specifications. Moreover, we shall show that the logical specifica- 
tion of any term of 0 may be expressed as a single characteristic formula. 
The logic we use is Hennessy-Milner Logic, without negation (cf. [7,14,16]). The 
formulae are given by the grammar: 
4::= .L I T I (a>@ I Iall4 I (#A41 I ($V$) 
We denote by @ the set of formulae of this logic, and we shall use 4, $, . . . to range over 
them. 
We now define by induction on the formula 4 the satisfaction relation (S, s) I= 4, to 
be read as “the graphical specification (S, s) satisfies (or is a model of) the formula 4”. 
This relation is defined as usual for the propositional connectives: I and T stand, 
respectively, for false and true, C#I A $ and 4 VI) are interpreted, respectively, as 
conjunction and disjunction. The interpretation of the modalities is somewhat un- 
usual: 
(i) An existential formula (a) 4 asserts the existence of an u-transition to a state 
satisfying 4. Therefore, the interpretation of such a formula is given by means of the 
required transitions, namely 
(s>s)l= ca>$ *def l’.s+k(S,s’)~ 4. 
(ii) A universal formula [a] 4 asserts that any possible a-transition reaches a state 
Graphical LW-sus logical specifications 11 
satisfying #J. Therefore, its interpretation is given by means of the allowed transitions, 
thus 
Note that if S is a process system, then this is exactly the usual satisfaction relation. 
For what regards the graphical system over terms, we shall use the notation t + 4 for 
($9, t) I= Cp. The notion of logical consequence (or implication) between formulae is 
defined by 
@G.\cI -def v(s,s).(s,s)\= 6 =Z- t&s)\= $. 
The logical equivalence associated with this preorder is 
For instance, [uj T = T and (a) I z I. Note that the modalities (a) and [ul are 
not dual. For instance, o satisfies neither [[uj _L nor (a) T: the specification w does 
not require anything, so it cannot satisfy a formula (a)+. On the other hand, [ul I 
expresses the fact that a system is not allowed to perform a, which is not the case for o. 
Let us see some examples of formulae satisfied by the terms of 0: 
tl=$ * 
u.tl= [U~C/I and Vb#u u.tl= [b]1, 
u!t(= (a)$ and u!t+ [uj~$. 
We now prove a generalized Hennessy-Mimer Theorem, relating refinement of 
graphical specifications and logical implication. To this end, let us denote by 9( S, s) 
the set of formulae satisfied by the graphical specification (S,s): 
This is the logical theory of the specification (S, s), or the set of formulae expressed by 
the specification (S, s). Then our “Hennessy-Milner Theorem” is 
Theorem 3.1. (S,s) ~(p,p) 0 9(s,s)~F(P,p). 
Proof. The proof is a slight modification of the standard one, cf. [7,14,16]. We only 
sketch here the arguments. To prove that 
(S,s) c (P,P) =- ~(S,S)C~(P,P), 
one uses Lemma 2.1 and shows, inductively on n, that if (S, s) E n (P, p) and (S, s) 
satisfies a formula C$ whose modal depth is at most IZ, then (P,p) satisfies also this 
formula. 
To prove the converse, assume (S, s) $ ,,+ 1 (P,p). There are then, two cases: either 
there exist a~,4 and s’ such that s d s’ and, for all p’, if p j p’, then (S, s’) $ n (P, p’), 
orthereexistu~Aandp’suchthatp~~p’and,foralls’,ifs_%ts’,then(S,s’)~.(P,p’). 
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In the first case one can find a formula of the form (a)(61 A ... A (Pk) satisfied by 
(S, s) but not by (P, p), while in the second case a distinguishing formula exists whose 
shape is [ul (41 V ... V &J. Cl 
Remark. We could not maintain this result while including (classical) negation in the 
logic. Any theory F(S, s) of a specification is complete with respect to negation, i.e. for 
any formula 4 either ~EP(S,S) or ~+EF(S,S). Therefore, F(S,s)cF(P,p)*F(S,s) 
=F(P,p). 
This result allows us to explain why a system (P,p) is not a refinement of another 
one (S, s): in this case, there exists a formula satisfied by the specification (S, s), but not 
by the system (P, p). Consider, for instance, the terms a. b!O and a!b. 0. Then their 
behaviours are completely described by the following: 
and 
u!b.O: b.020. 
It is easy to see that u!b.O is not a refinement of u.b!O, and the formula [ul (b) T 
can be seen as an explanation of this fact as it is satisfied by a. b!O but not by a! b. 0. 
One may think of the theory F(S, s) as the logical character of the graphical system 
(S, s), and the previous result may be regarded as a representation theorem: a graphi- 
cal specification may be represented by a logical specification (=set of formulae). 
More precisely, let us say that a set F of formulae represents a graphical specification 
(S, s) if and only if verifying that a system is a model (i.e. a refinement) of (S, s) amounts 
to check that this system is a model of F: 
F represents (S,s) edef V(P,p).(S,s) K (P,p) o V&EF (P,p)t= 4. 
Then the previous theorem asserts that 9(S, s) represents (S, s). One may wonder 
whether this logical character may be condensed into a single characteristic formula 
x(S, s). This problem has been addressed by Graf and Sifakis ([6], see also [15]). As 
a matter of fact, any term of 0 may be represented by a characteristic formula (cf. [ 111, 
where a more general result is obtained, by means of recursive formulae). More 
precisely, one may define a translation x: O-t@ yielding formulae x(t) of the form 
The definition is as follows: 
(with the convention that T is the empty conjunction), where the set of formulae 6(t) 
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_ the existential part - and the formulae y.(t) - the universal part w.r.t. a ~ are given 
inductively by 
(i) 6(O)=@, yJO)=I and S(o)=& ya(co)=T; 
(ii) s(a.t)=$!t and yb(a*t)= 
x(t) if b=u, 
_L otherwise; 
(iii) 6(a!t)={(a)~(t)} and ~~(a!t)=‘~~(a.t); 
(iv) &rO+tI)=&rO)MtI) and Ya(to+tl)=Ya(to)VYa(tl). 
Note that, due to the particular form of characteristic formulae we chose, the formula 
x(w) cannot be simply T (but is logically equivalent to T). 
Let us see an example: consider again the terms a. b!O and a! b .O, and assume 
A = {a, b}. Using the above inductive definition, the following characteristic formulae 
can be computed: 
xCO,=IIul~ A lb] 1, 
zdW=<b)x(O) A [[all 1 A Ubli x(O), 
x(b-O)=Uall 1 A Ubl x(O), 
X(u.b!O)=[u] X(b!O) A [b] I, 
x(u!b.O)=(u)X(b.O) A [uj X(b.0) A [b] 1. 
From this it is easy to see that ~(a. b!O)< [u] (b) T, whereas this last formula is not 
a consequence of ~(a! b .O). 
Proposition 3.2. For any term tE@ 
($2 t) E (S, s) 0 (S, s) I= x(t). 
The proof may be found in [ll]. 
Remark. To deal with an infinite alphabet of actions, we should introduce more 
general modalities, namely ,A,aeB[u4 I, where B is a cofinite set of actions. 
As a consequence of this result, the refinement preorder on terms of 0 is represented 
by logical implication of their characteristic formulae: 
Corollary 3.3. t c t’ o x(t’)<x(t) and t+ 4 o X(t)<+. 
4. Graphical representation of formulae 
In Section 3 we have shown a correspondence from graphical specifications to the 
lattice of logical theories. In this section we will establish a converse correspondence. 
To this end, let us first state some definitions. A formula C$ is consistent if it has 
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a model, i.e. if there exists a graphical specification (S, s) such that (S, s) + 4. The 
formula 4 is prime if, whenever it implies a disjunction, then it implies one of the 
disjuncts, i.e. 
Usually a prime is required to be consistent, whereas 1 is prime according to our 
definition. Let us see an example: for any t& the characteristic formula X(t) is 
consistent since t I= x(t); moreover, if x( t) d cj V $, then t + C/I V $, i.e. by definition of 
the satisfaction relation, t (= 4 or t I= $, hence x(t) d 4 or x(t) < $ (by the Corollary 
3.3). This shows that the characteristic formula of a term is a consistent prime formula. 
On the other hand, the (consistent) formula #=(a) T V (b) T is an example of 
nonprime formula: neither $,,=(a) T nor 41 =(b) T is a consequence of 4, since 
a!w(b!o) is a model of 4, but not of 4r (&). 
We shall say that a formula $J is graphically representable if and only if there exists 
a graphical specification (S,s) such that checking that a system is a model of 
r$ amounts to verifying that this system is a refinement of (S,s), thus 
Obviously, a system represents a formula if and only if the formula represents this 
system (in the sense of Section 3), and if (S, s) represents 4, then (S, s) I= 4 (hence, 4 is 
consistent). Then our main result is the following theorem. 
Theorem. A formula is graphically representable if and only ifit is consistent and prime. 
More precisely, we shall show that any formula is representable by a finite set of 
terms of 0, and this set can be reduced to a singleton when the given formula is 
consistent and prime. This establishes a Galois connection between the preordered set 
of terms (0, c) and the preordered set (II, 6) of consistent prime formulae. 
The proof of our result relies on a specific notion of “normal form” for formulae. Let 
us first introduce the usual notion of normal form - using the convention that I is the 
empty disjunction and T the empty conjunction. A formula is said to be in normal 
form if it has the form 
where r$j, t,!~f are themselves in normal form. For instance, the characteristic formulae 
x(t) of terms are in normal form, without head disjunction. Using standard distribu- 
tivity properties (and tautologies like 4 A T = c$), it is easy to see the following fact. 
Fact. For every formula of Q, there exists a logically equivalent formula in normal form, 
with the same modal depth. 
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We will now prove a stronger result, introducing our more specific notion of normal 
form - which is not purely syntactic. Note that in a formula in normal form the 
universal modalities may be grouped (within a disjunct), so that for any action a there 
is exactly one subformula [[u] $ in each disjunct (recall that [u] T = T; hence, these 
formulae may be freely added, when the set of actions is finite). Also one may ensure 
that if a disjunct contains subformulae [a] $ and (a) 4, then the latter “includes” the 
universal information about u-transitions, i.e. 4 d $. Therefore, we shall say that 
a formula is in strong normal form if it is T or has the form 
i(jh G+P::A A r.n+ 
OEA 
where 4j, $6 are in strong normal form, and 
,j=, 5 Cp;z& 
Note that due to our conventions, -L is in strong normal form. Moreover, one may 
check that the characteristic formulae of terms are in strong normal form. 
Lemma 4.1. For every formula C#I of @ there exists a logically equivalent formula C$ * in 
strong normal form, with the same modal depth. 
Proof. By induction on the modal depth of 4. By the previous fact, we may assume 
that 4 is in normal form, i.e. 
4=v( A +j)4;A A [h;ltbi). 
ieI jsJ, ksK, 
Let 
*b= A *;> 
(klb;=o) 
so that $A=T if {kIbi=a}=cb, and 
qf=(+; A $6) 
where a = a:. By induction hypothesis, both the formulae $6 and ,pj possess equivalent 
strong normal forms, respectively, ($i)* and (vi)*. Now if we let 
4*=Li jfi <,j> (P:)*AOi [IaIl (11/i)* > 
( I 1 
it is easy to see that C$J E C$ *, due to the basic laws 
Iall$ A im-i[4w A14 [u] TrT, and 
<a>$ A [raJy=(a) (Ic/ A 7) A II+. 
TO prove this last equation, one uses 5 G 5. Moreover, it is easy to see that #* is 
in strong normal form, since ( I,!I A y ) < y. 0 
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Let us say that a formula C$ is represented by a set T of terms if the following holds: 
V(S,s).(S,s)+ 4 o 3teT.(9,t)~((S,s). 
We then define, for a formula 4 in strong normal form, a finite set f3( 4) of terms which 
is intended to represent 4. The definition is by induction on the structure of 4: 
(i) @T)=(w); 
tEe(fb) -def 
64 e(VisI 4i)=UicIe(4i). 
Note that in the second case, if O( 4j) = 8 for some ~EJ, then O( 4) =8. As we shall see, 
this means $j- I; hence, 4 E 1. 
Examples. This definition suggests, to cope with the subterms oB = CrroB a. w arising 
from the formulae [u] T, the following graphical convention: in drawings, a square 
q represents a state s such that s: w for any action a that is not explicitly drawn as 
outgoing from this state. Then for instance CO is simply represented by q (without any 
exiting edge). The set of terms representing 4 = (a) T consists of the single term 
a!o + o._, . Using our graphical convention, the specification determined by this term 
may be drawn as 
Therefore, the formula (b) T V (c) T is represented by a set of two such graphical 
specifications (as we have seen, this formula is not prime). 
Similarly, the graphical interpretation of the formula $ = [u] ((b) T V (c) T) 
consists of the single term oA _(a1 + a. (b!w + crA) + a. (c!w + (TV). The graphical speci- 
fication determined by this term may be drawn as shown in Fig. 1. 
Note that the formula $J A II/ is not in strong normal form, but is equivalent to 
Fig. 1 
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(4 
Fig. 2. 
(since ( a) (& V @1 ) = (a ) &, V (a) 41 ). This formula, which is easily converted into 
a strong normal form by adding [b] T and [c] T (assuming A = { a,b,c}), may be 
represented by a set of two graphical specifications as shown in Fig. 2. 
We can now prove our claim that for any formula $ in strong normal form, the set 
0( q%) represents this formula: 
Proposition 4.2. For any formula 4 in strong normal form 
Proof. First we show that tEQ(4) a t I= 4. This will show the “err part of the 
proposition (using the Hennessy-Milner Theorem). We proceed by induction on the 
structure of q5. The case C$ = T is trivial; so, let us assume that 
4=A <"j>4jn A lIall$a. 
js.l lleA 
Then 
where ujEB(4j) for any ~EJ. If t: t’, then either t’~0($,) or t’E~(~j) for some ~EJ 
such that Uj=U. In the first case we have, by induction hypothesis, t’ + $,, and, 
similarly, in the second case t’ + ~j. Since C$ is in strong normal form we have 4j < $,; 
hence, in any case t’+ $a. This shows 
On the other hand. we have 
VjEJ tl= (uj>4jt 
since by definition t 2 Uj, with ~~~8(4~), and Uj I= 4j by induction hypothesis. By 
definition of the satisfaction relation as regards conjunction, we then have t I= 4. To 
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conclude this first part of the proof, we note that the case 4 = Vi.1 pi is trivial since 
4iGVicI 4i. 
Conversely, assume that (S, s) + 4 (4 in strong normal form). We show by induc- 
tion on the structure of the formula 4 that there exists t~f3( 4) such that (3, t) c (S, s). 
The disjunctive case, i.e. @=ViEl 4i, is trivial, as well as the case &= T; so, let us 
assume that 
$=A Caj>4j /j IT”4 $a. 
jcJ lZEA 
Since (S, s) + (aj) 4j, by induction hypothesis, for everyjEJ, there exists qj such that 
s 2 qj and UjEd(4j) such that (3, uj) c (S,qj). Therefore, we may define a “$-approx- 
imation” of (S, s): 
Clearly, LEO(~). Let us show that (9, t) F (S,s): if t 5 t’, then there exists jEJ such 
that a=aj and t’=Ujr and (9, Uj) C_ (S, qj) by construction. Therefore, a transition 
required by t is matched by a definite transition of (S, s). Now if s2 s’, then (S, s’) + $11 
(for (S, s) I= [Tan $J; h ence, by induction hypothesis there exist: u~tJ($,) such that 
(3, v) F (S, s’), and t2 v by definition of the term t. 0 
Remark. To deal with a possibly infinite set of actions, we should restrict the notion 
of strong normal form, allowing only finite universal parts AbeB [b] $b in each 
disjunct, and use terms of the form t+~(~_~) to represent these formulae. 
One may note that this result shows that any formula is logically equivalent to 
a (possibly empty) disjunction of consistent prime formulae, namely: 
where 4* is a formula in strong normal form which is logically equivalent to 
4 (Lemma 4.1). Remark also that our proofs entail the decidability of the satisfiability 
problem in our logic: 4 is satisfiable if and only if Q( 4*) is nonempty, where 4 * is built 
as in the proof of Lemma 4.1. Moreover, the consequence relation 4 6$ is also 
decidable since 
$G$ - vtEe($*ptke(lC/*).t’ E t. 
We may now prove our main result, 
Proof of the Theorem. First we show that if 4 is graphically represented by (S, s), then 
4 is consistent (this is obvious since (S, s) /= 4) and prime. Assume that 4 d ($J~ V 41); 
then (S, s) I= &, V cjl, i.e. by defintion of the satisfaction relation, (S, s) (= $Ji for i = 0 or 
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i= 1. Since (S, s) represents 4, for any model (P,p) of 4 we then have, using the 
Hennessy-Milner Theorem, (P,p) I= $i. This shows 4<&. 
Now assume that 4 is consistent and prime, and let O( 4 *) = ( tl,. . . , t,,} , where 4 * is 
a formula in strong normal form which is logically equivalent to 4 (Lemma 4.1). Since 
4 is consistent (hence, also 4*), this set is nonempty. If II = 1, then tl represents #*, by 
the previous proposition, and also C$ since 4 = e5*. If n> 1, then $<x(ti) for some 
i since ~-Vl~i~~X(ti) and 4 is prime. But then $Ex(ti) since x(ti)<4 (due to the 
general law li/ < $ V y); therefore, 
(S,S)l= 4 0 (S,S)/= x(ti) for x(ti)-4: 
o (9, ti) E (S, s) by Proposition 3.2, 
i.e. ti represents f$. 0 
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